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EXISTENTIALISM: A PHILOSOPHY OF 
HOPE OR DESPAIR?* 
I DON'T suppose that anyone who has lived in Paris during the two or three years that followed its liberation from 
the Nazi occupation can ever think about that city in quite 
the same way as the average tourist thinks about it or, for 
that matter, as it is depicted in travel folders, magazine 
advertisements and the cinema. For no war comes to an 
end as abruptly as it is begun nor, surely, can any decree 
or treaty or celebration bring to populations the profound 
awareness that the long nightmare is over, that the time 
for peace and normal living has at last arrived. Misery has 
its own inertia, and for many months the sense of loss and 
abandonment continues; to each one there cling all the 
harsh memories of war and, too often, of enslavement. 
I t  is hardly my intention to describe the Paris of that un- 
happy time, but it has often struck me that one of the reasons 
existentialism, or the existentialist movement, is so generally 
misinterpreted is that its critics seldom take into account 
the circumstances that surrounded its inception and develop- 
ment. I t  is one thing to envisage ideas as the inhabitants of 
books and lecture halls and classrooms, and another as an 
intimate and inseparable part of our daily lives; and this is 
just what existentialism was during that strange transitional 
time in Paris when the vast mantrap of oppression was sud- 
denly lifted from a whole city and left its population squint- 
ing and bewildered under the sharp white light of freedom. 
I do not mean that Paris was full of existentialists, that the 
flower vendors and housewives and bus conductors were all 
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existentialists, or even looked like existentialists, presuming 
it is possible to look like an existentialist. But there was some- 
thing in the ail., amid all the sadness and privation and 
bewilderment, and I think that something was the convic- 
tion-vague, it is true, and generally unformulated-that 
through torture and peril and humiliation something in each 
of us remains inviolate, something can never be taken away, 
even temporarily, even for an instant, something like a hard 
unalterable core at the center of the human spirit, that 
may be called-perhaps for want of a better word-liberty. 
And this was felt not only by those of the underground move- 
ment who risked their lives to sustain it, but by those who 
tried to go on living as best they could, who tried to make 
the abnormal seem normal and the unnatural seem natural. 
To be sure, it was felt more vividly by those who resisted, 
because nothing brings truth into focus so sharply as peril, 
and it was among the elite of these that existentialism first 
emerged as a dynamic and eminently pertinent system of 
human thought. 
There may be some who will protest at this point that 
existentialism is strictly speaking not a French philosophy 
at all, nor even, indeed, a phi.Iosophy to begin with. Jacques 
Maritain, for example, has remarked that "the misfortune of 
existentialism has been that it has risen and developed within 
the realm of philosophy . . . and yet it is a philosophy against 
philosophy.'" To the second of these objections I would reply 
that what has made existentialism so vital, or in any case so 
influential, seems to lie in its very stand against traditional 
philosophy, and in the way it is committed to a form of truth 
so close to the fundamental realities of human existence that 
it defies ordinary analysis. Perhaps this is why the best of 
existentialist writing is not to be found in tracts and essays- 
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such as this one, for example-but in works of a creative and 
a semi-creative nature. I have already hinted that existential- 
ism is concerned with human liberty; I should add that it is 
also, and by the same token, a philosophy of action. It is not 
primarily a philosophy that seeks to interpret and explain; 
rather, it seeks to lay bare the fundamental enigma of what 
we are. And this, it seems to me, is precisely what constitutes 
the specific function of creative literature. Certainly not all 
literature can be said to be existentialist, and only a small part 
of it may be said to be consciously existentialist, but surely 
our greatest myths and stories are concerned less with answer- 
ing questions than with asking them. It is false to suppose 
that Oedipus, for example, solved the riddle of his own 
existence-he merely made it clearer; and his riddle is our 
own, I t  is foolish to think that Hamlet answered the question 
"to be or not to be"; he merely posed it with passion and 
urgency. And since existentialism, like literature, is committed 
to interrogation rather than affirmation, it seems to me that it 
finds its best expression in the novel and the drama, or even, 
as in the case of Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel, in personal 
diaries; although it is true that others, like Jaspers, Husserl, 
and Heidegger, have remained what we may call pure phi- 
losophers, and even Jean-Paul Sartre, with whom I shall be 
pal-ticularl~ concerned, has attempted formal description in 
at least one important work and a couple of lesser ones. 
FinalIy, there are a number of novelists and playwrights of 
postwar France who can scarcely be called philosophers, at 
least in this sense, and yet whose work bears the existentialist 
stamp. Most important among these, I think, are Albert 
Camus, Maurice Blanchot, and Simone de Beauvoir, and 
many are the little-known writers of the postwar generation 
who have faIlen under the influence of existentialist doctrine. 
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Nor should we neglect those whose works may be described 
as existentialist in tone, in atmosphere, in significance, al- 
though their authors were more certainly than not unaware 
of any connection, if they knew about existentialism at all. 
The Czech novelist Franz Kafka is often designated as an 
unconsciousIy "existentialist" writer, and so are William 
Faulkner, Andre Malraux, Dostoievski. With some reseiva- 
tions, the same thing may be said of certain aspects of the 
work of And& Gide, Stendhal, and Ei-nest Hemingway. 
There remains the first objection: that existentialism is not 
French and that it is not new. As a self-conscious doctrine it 
is, indeed, well over a hundred years old, its founder having 
been the Danish religious thinker Spren Kierkegaard. Other 
admittedly existentialist thinkers are the Germans-Edmund 
HusserI, who stumbled into existentialism by way of a branch 
of philosophy called phenomenology; Karl Jaspers, generally 
considered to be a disciple of Kierkegaard; and Martin 
Heidegger, a former rector and lecturer at the University 
of Freiburg, to whom Sartre obviously owes a great deal. 
France itself had an existentialist philosopher as far back as 
1930 in the person of Gabriel Marcel, who belongs to what 
may be called the Catholic Wing. Furthermore, it has been 
contended that just as there are unconscious existentialists 
among creative writers, so there are unconscious existential- 
ists among philosophers, Was Socrates the Erst existentialist? 
The point has been argued, and I see no reason why it should 
not be true. The same claim has been made for Nietzsche, for 
Schelling, for the earlier Negel, for Pascal and Descartes, 
and even, with good reason, for Henri Bergson. 
The plain fact is that whether one chooses to consider 
existentialism a philosophy, or an anti-philosophy, or neither, 
in one way or another its basic point of view has been an 
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ingredient of human thought for many centuries, and it is 
not unlikely that each of us has at one time or another 
thought, as it were, "existentially" about his problems and 
condition. It may very well be that moments of crisis, of 
danger, of despair, tend to compel us to the existentialist 
point of view, and surely this is one reason why the move- 
ment became so popular in France at the moment in its 
history of which I have been speaking. For it was then that 
existentialism ceased to be a problem for professional phi- 
losophers and became a force, a conviction, a climate. There 
is no doubt that it will be identified with postwar intellectual 
France in the same way that surrealism, for example, is identi- 
fied with the span between the wars, symbolism with the 
turn of the last century, and realism with the middle nineties. 
Each of these doctrines-and there are many, for France is 
the great progenitor of the world's "isms"-must be explained 
not only in its own terms, but in terms of the historic moment 
that gave it urgency and vitality; and, finally, of the men 
who lived that moment. 
The man who is surely most directly responsible for what 
some call the existentialist vogue is Jean-Paul Sartre. Born 
in Paris of a middle-class family, Sartre received his earliest 
education in the provinces, returning to the capital for ad- 
vanced studies in philosophy at the celebrated 2cole NOT- 
male. This was foIlowed by sixteen months in the military 
service and a short spell as a teacher in a lyce'e-the French 
equivalent of our high school. At the outbreak of war, in 1939, 
Sartre was thirty-four. He enlisted in the medical corps and 
was taken prisoner in June of 1940. Returning to a defeated 
France and to a Paris darkened by the shadow of the enemy, 
he enrolled in the underground movement, later, it is said, 
organizing his own group, and at  the same time revealing a 
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brilliant aptitude for journalism as a writer for various clan- 
destine publications. He continued this career after the libera- 
tion as a correspondent for the famed newspaper Combat, 
His assignments during this period included a trip to America 
and I presume that it was in America, too, that he came to 
appreciate writers like Faulkner and Steinbeck. In any case 
it would be difficult to appraise his talent as a novelist with- 
out taking into account their influence. 
As a novelist Sartre was already known in his own country 
as the author of a short work bearing the quaintly existential- 
ist title Nausea, which is the formidably depressing stoly of 
a man engaged in the lucid contemplation of himself. He ends 
by discovering that the world is absurd and human life even 
more so, and slowly flounders in what can only be described 
as a miasma of subjectivity. I t  is noteworthy that the scene 
of the novel is Le Havre, where Sartre had taught school for 
a while. But both the scene and the action are so slight that 
it is difficult to call Nausea a novel at all. A number of short 
stories, collected under the title The Wall, are livelier but 
they too are concerned with the subjective side of life, and it 
was not until the tetralogy The Roads to Liberty, the first 
volun~e of which was published in 1945,% that Sartre found 
that his talent as a creative writer lay in the projection of 
human character not from within but fro111 without, some- 
what as a realist or a naturalist would, so that this vast and 
lusty canvas of life in Emope before the outbreak of war and 
during the first weeks of hostilities is nothing if not an intsi- 
cate weaving together of many situations and actions as 
diverse as the characters who accomplish them. The result 
is that the reader has the impression not so much that he is 
following a story as that he is perusing a rapidly turning 
* The fourth volume has not yet appeared. 
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kaleidoscope or a series of rapid flashes, in which characters 
and situations are somehow fused, so that one is often at a 
loss to tell whether the characters determine the situations 
or the situations the characters. And since the action skips 
without any sort of warning from Paris to the Riviera to 
North Africa to Spain and even to America the reader sooner 
or later gets the impression of a sort of totality. It seems that 
the author is saying that every man is endlessly involved in 
specific situations, that his reality depends on his being so 
involved, and that each situation is a facet of the history of 
the world; indeed that in some way the action of each human 
being determines the destiny of every other human being. 
But even more important, as we shall see, is the role that 
liberty plays a Sartre's world, and I should not hesitate to 
say that for want of a hero in this formless imbroglio of char- 
acters who seem to be in perpetual crisis-the fact that one 
of them, Mathieu, resembles Sartre like a brother does not 
alter things very much-the central character is not a char- 
acter at all, but a concept: human liberty. I t  is perhaps be- 
cause Sartre strives to leave their liberty intact that his char- 
acters move about so freely and that the novel seems to 
be in so many places at once.  he fact that there is so much 
action and so little plot almost leads one to believe that 
Sartre would define plot as the technique by which an author 
ccenslaves" his creations. 
Nevertheless, many admirers of Sartre claim that it is in 
the drama that his creative talents find their clearest expres- 
sion and there is much to be said for this, particularly when 
one considers how much of the novels is made up of dialogue. 
But their plot may scarcely be said to be their strong point 
except where, as in the case of Tlze Flies, Sartre is inspired 
by the Greeks, or where he is writing for the cinema, which 
8 The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
is the case of The Chips Are Down. Once again, it seems to 
me, the real subject is liberty, whether it is moral liberty, 
as in The Devil and tlze Good Lord, or political liberty, as 
in Dirty Hands, or the relation of the liberty of one person 
to that of others, as in No Exit. In all, Sartre has written some 
half-dozen plays, ranging in length from one act to the recent 
and ambitious Deuil and the Good Lord, which runs for al- 
most four hours. Their settings include mythical kjllgdoms in 
medieval and modern Europe, France under the occupation, 
the American South, and a drab furnished room which, the 
audience soon discovers, is Hell. Although one or two of 
them are spoiled, according to some critics, by a rather broad 
streak of melodrama, their real interest lies in their characters' 
probing of isolated situations, rather than that accumuIation 
of excitement from situation to situation which. we call sus- 
pense. 
To all of this a complete account of Sartre's activities 
should join a large number of essays on everything from 
labor unions to poetry (for in 1946 he became chief editor of 
one of Parisy most important revues, Modern Tinzes), and of 
course the works of a purely philosopl~ical nature. The earliest 
of these are relatively brief, and are concerned with special 
problems relating to the imagination and, significantly, to 
Husserl's conception of consciousness as intentional rather 
than structural. Sartre's major work, which bears the forbid- 
ding title Being and Nothingness, appeared in 1943 and 
turned out to be a huge tome of some 700 closely printed 
pages. I t  is not recommended for light summer reading, or 
for any reading at all, I should imagine, unless one happens 
to have mastered beforehand the perplexities of advanced 
philosophical jargon. Suftice it to say, at this point, that here 
Sartre, abandoning isolated ~roblems in the field of ontology, 
takes up the problem of being-or, if you will, human exist- 
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ence-as a whole, and exposes at length the underlying 
themes of his doctrine. I suspect that there is an appalling 
discrepancy between the number of people who have read 
this weighty volume and the number of those who claim 
to have read it. It has been called, perhaps a t r ae  ironically, 
the Bible of Existentialism. 
Clearly, then, the problem of existentialism, even from an 
historical point of view, is a very complex one. It is difficult, 
for one thing, to speak of any particular philosopher without 
being concei-ned with what he owes to a wide variety of 
others, starting with Socrates. It is di£Ecult to tell, so far as 
existentialism is concerned, where philosophy ends and litera- 
ture begins. Finally, it is feasible to affirm that existentialism 
may not legitimately be called a philosophy at all. And yet 
one fact remains, and it is simply this: that were it not for 
Sartre and what we may call the French School, most of us 
should not have heard of existentialism at all; for it was Sartre 
himself who saw that existentialism, unlike traditional phil- 
osophical theories, has no validity at all unless it is anchored 
in experience, and particularly the sort of experience that he, 
Sartre, had undergone in a France where liberty had ceased 
to be a slogan and became something you fight and die for. 
The French are a disconcerting people. Not only have they 
endowed Western civilization with some of its purest and 
most decisive ideas, but they insist upon wrapping them up 
in whimsical packages. This, I suppose, attests to their irre- 
pressible gaiety, or in any case to their sense of humor, but 
it leads to a certain amount of misunderstanding, For ex- 
ample, it gives to many people, Frenchmen as well as for- 
eigners, the impression that French intellectual, literary, and 
artistic history is very largely accomplished in the cafes by 
boisterous and uninhibited young men whose buoyancy is 
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exceeded only by their fervent disregard for convention. Dur- 
ing the Romantic movement these colorful and somewhat 
lunatic habituks of the cabarets and bistros of the, Left Bank 
called themselves Jeune Frnnce-"Young Francen-and during 
the symbolist and impressiollist movements, Decadents. When 
surrealism and cubism were in vogue they were Dadaists, and 
now that existentialism has become, as we say, all the rage, 
it is not surprising that these joyful antagonists of middle- 
class platitude should have adopted the existentialist banner 
for their very own. To be sure, they are Bohemians of a 
very modern sort, these so-called Existentialists, and possibly 
they harbor some vague notion that an addiction to dis- 
arrayed clothing and some of the more cacophonous foims 
of Dixieland Jazz is an expression of Sartre's idea of human 
liberty. The truth of the matter is that they are no more 
representative of existentialism, which is in reality the stern- 
est of philosophies, than they were of ron~anticism or sur- 
realism. They do provide a good deal of amusing and often 
profitable publicity, and sul~ound the doctrines theniselves 
with an aura of charming insanity which tends to give to 
their contemporaries the illusion that it is they, and not 
Victor Hugo, Auguste Renoir, or Pablo Picasso, who are 
making artistic and literary history, an illusion which history 
itself quickly rectifies. 
I must confess, however, that the recollection I most fre- 
quently associate with existentialisnl has nothing to do with 
the intellectual cliques of the Latin Quarter or Saint-Gemain- 
des-PA. At about this time I was living in a Paris apartment 
not far from the Parc Monceau, and one of my neighbors was 
a small French boy named Claude. One day I gave Claude 
an old copy of Life magazine I happened to have, and not 
long afterwards he knocked at my door, explaining that he 
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was frankly puzzled by one of the pictures. I t  turned out that 
the picture was part of an advertisement, as I recall, on the 
subject of aluminum awnings, but it was not the awnings that 
interested Claude; it was the little boy in the picture. He was 
standing on a lawn in front of a house (equipped, presumably, 
with the product in question) and he was eating an ice creain 
cone. What, Claude wanted to know, is that? Nor was 
Claude's ignorance surprising, when one remembers that he 
belonged to that unfortunate generation which had grown 
up in a France where milk was rationed by the pint, butter 
by the gram, and sugar by the half pound. So I gave him 
what I thought was a very accurate and succinct definition 
of the substance called ice cream. His reply was a Iook of 
direst bewilderment. I decided to try again, this time attack- 
ing the concept from the standpoint of ingredients. Having 
failed just as dismally this time, I went into a long story of 
why children Iike ice cream, when they eat it, and what they 
will do to get it. All this met with not the slightest response, 
and I had the feeling that I was trying to explain an obscure 
problem of algebra to someone who had not yet learned 
simple addition. The look of reproach on that boy's face 
haunted me for many weeks afterward, until one day I 
heard that ice cream, if not ice cream cones, was sold at the 
Paris chapter of the American Legion, which is just off the 
Champs ~lyskes. I managed to acquire a pint of the precious 
commodity and rushed home in time to stumble over Claude 
playing the French version of marbles at the front door. His 
mother, the concierge, promptly rushed out a spoon and lo 
and behold, as spoonful after spoonful swept to their destina- 
tion, the light came over Claude. His eyes shone and his lips, 
as besmirched as any child's should be-chocolate was all I 
could get-broke into a broad smile, This was ice cream: a 
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stickiness on the face, a coldness and a sweetness in the 
throat, a solid at first and yet somehow, too, a liquid, so that 
you were never quite sure whether you ate it or drank it; 
it was all of these things and yet one thing-an experience, 
unique and wonderful. 
I don't h o w  whether this anecdote, if one can call it that, 
will strike anyone as having a moral, but it does have one for 
me, and it is this: that what we may call the sheer experience 
of living from day to day, from hour to hour, from moment 
to moment, is son~ehow beyond any sort of rational explana- 
tion. Now, it is precisely with some such idea as this that 
existentialism takes its start. I do not mean that it denies to 
the intelligence its long-held supremacy since the days of 
Descartes, but rather that, like the philosophy of Bergson, it 
restricts its role and importance. Certainly, simply by using 
his intelligence, man has learned a great deal not only about 
the universe but about himself, and between behaviorism 
on the one hand and psychoanalysis on the other, there is 
not much about his conduct for which, on the rational level, 
man cannot supply what appears to be a rational explanation. 
And yet there is a catch. Somehow, in describing the nature 
of ice cream to Claude, my explanation, as rational or as 
scientific as it could be, had missed fire. For clearly, the only 
thing that could have satisfied Claude was experience itself. 
To be sure, it is plain common sense to say that words can 
never replace actions, and we are all familiar with the adage 
about sticks and stones. But if this is true, if somehow there 
is a profound antinomy between our actions and our explana- 
tions, if man is not one but two, a creature who acts and a 
creature who reasons, then man himself contains a mystery 
that can never be ultimately dispelled, and it is the mystery 
of his sheer capacity to behave in particular ways in   articular 
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experiences. For the existentialist the source of our actions 
does not lie in our reasons for them, but in something he calls 
our "subjectivity," in other words, some sort of pure con- 
sciousness- artr re calls it "non-thetic" consciousness-which 
exists before any reasons we might supply to explain its exis- 
tence. I t  is a little as though the existentialists were replacing 
Descartes' famous "I think, therefore I am" with a proposition 
more fundamental still: "I exist, therefore I am." Man may ask 
the question "why" about many things with reasonable expec- 
tations of finding an answer; he can never ask the same ques- 
tion about himself because he is the question. He can never 
afEect the juncture between his subjectivity and his reasoning 
about his subjectivity-he is always, as Heidegger puts it, 
"outside of himself." Fundamentally, therefore, existentialism 
is an attempt to place our subjective selves at the center of 
philosophical investigation. At the same time, it discredits tra- 
ditional systems and theories about the universe on the 
ground that these systems have never taken into account 
the fact that they have their source in a particular human 
being, in the pure "I" which thought them up. As Kierkegaard 
has said, "Most systematizers in relation to their system fare 
like a man who builds a huge palace and himself lives next 
door to it in a barn." 
I have, perhaps, oversimplified the question, but it may 
serve to lead me to some of the themes which are a part of 
existentialist doctrine. I think it is already clear that one of 
these, at least so far as Sartre is concerned, is liberty. For 
surely, if our actions are in some way anterior to our reasons 
for them, then it must follow that they can be restricted by 
absolutely nothing and the fundamental reality of each hu- 
man being is that he is totally and unconditionally free. It is 
not enough to say that liberty is subjective: it is our subjec- 
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tivity, and therefore utterly different from liberty as we 
ordinarily think of it, that is, liberty on the rational level. 
Liberty in this sense, being objective, can readily be defined 
in some way-usually as a collection of "rights," although few 
of us would be likely to agree exactly as to what those rights 
are; and whether the definition is provided by Thoinas JeEer- 
son or John Stuart Mill or Webster's dictionary, it is some- 
thing we say we "enjoy," something that can be given to us 
or taken away. This is not liberty as Sartre thinks of it. I 
should hate to use, in so cursory and slender a summation as 
this, the term "metaphysical," but it would be difficult to 
ascribe a more common one to a sort of liberty that is so in- 
timately bound up with existence itself. Since man is nothing 
if not experience, since at every moment of his histoly man 
is acting in some way, then surely his main concern must be 
to choose one sort of action ainong many. At every moment, 
therefore, he makes a choice, even if his choice is so simple 
as, for example, whether to light a cigarette or not to light a 
cigarette, whether to read a newspaper or walk around the 
block, whether to go to a concert or to a movie. Our constant 
question is "Shall I or shall I not?"-and even should we sus- 
pend the question, like Hamlet, or choose not to choose, we 
have already made a sort of a choice, which consists in not 
making one. Man is that creature who always chooses, and 
the reason, simple enough, is that he is always in a situation, 
he is always at the center of a network of circumstances in 
which he cannot remain fixed except, of course, at the risk 
of ceasing to exist. To put it in another way, man never "is"; 
he is always "here" or "there"-a distinction the Gelman 
existentialist Heidegger draws when he insists upon the dif- 
ference in his own vocabulary between the verb "to be"- 
sein-and "to be therey'-dasein. For Heidegger it is the dasein 
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and not the sein which signifies human reality. We have al- 
ready seen that this was Sartre's most striking originality as 
a aovelist. For the existentialist wsiter man is concrete and 
specific rather than, as for the classicist, abstract and uni- 
versal; but his realism, instead of rising, as does that of Flau- 
best, from the wellsprings of positivism, has its source in hu- 
man subjectivity. For since there is no such thing as an ab- 
stract man, but always a man-plus-a-situation, then each of 
us must be unique and irreplaceable, for at each instant our 
liberty, to use an expression dear to Sartre, is "engaged"; at  
each instant we must decide to do this or that. 
It is, indeed, our decisions that give the world order and 
sense. My cigarette, for example, is absurd except as some- 
thing that I may or may not smoke. In  the same way, the 
world is absurd to Alice after she has gone through the loolc- 
ing glass because, once in Wonderland, she is no longer the 
center of her own situations but moves, so to speak, in the 
periphery of some one else's: the mad Hatter's or the Red 
Queen's. It is this same impression, that of being ourselves 
and yet a pure object, that we encounter in our dreams. The 
heroes of the Czech novelist, Franz Kafka, are also instruc- 
tive in this regard. Because they have lost their liberty-that 
is, the initiative of choice-they seem to have lost their foot- 
hold on the universe. They are always, so to speak, on the out- 
side looking in, and they wander about in their towns and 
vilIages with the obscure awareness that they are familiar to 
everyone, and yet that no one, not even one they love, is 
familiar to them, The fact is, however, that Kafka's novels 
are as contrived and liberal in their fantasy as Lewis Carroll's 
tale, for they are based on a premise that is impossible. Yet 
all of us, as we shall see, tend to deny our liberty; all of us 
are possessed in some degree with the nostalgia to be a pure 
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object. And conversely, few of us are ever totally aware of 
the absolute liberty which is at the source of our existence, 
for such an awareness can never be a kind of knowledge but 
rather a kind of feeling, perhaps, indeed, a kind of intuition 
not unlike Bergson's. To be aware of one's liberty in this way 
is to feel profoundly that each choice we make, being a total 
manifestation of our liberty, is itself total and places our 
whole being, as Sartre says, in question, like the spinning of 
a roulette wheel when the chips are down. The specific emo- 
tion that accompanies this revelation of our absolute liberty 
is defined by Sartre as a sort of anguish-Heidegger calls it 
"dread"-but to all intents and purposes they are referring to 
the same thing. We feel dread, or anguish, when we have the 
sense of advancing into the future as into a sheer emptiness 
and, literally, that our existence has nothing to fall back on 
except its capacity to go forward. It is an emotion, I am sure, 
that we have all experienced at one moment or another, al- 
though I suppose that, like our moments of fear, we do our 
best to forget them. But whereas fear is always fear of some- 
thing, anguish, or dread, is literally fear of nothing. I t  is the 
awareness that we are "in suspense" or, to use an expression 
of the poet Paul Valkry, of being "an ever future hollowness." 
I t  has the effect of stripping our existence of the respectable 
attire with which our reason bedecks it, 
Anguish, however, does not occur alone. By itself it may 
perhaps best be described as a metaphysical emotion, if one 
can speak of such a thing, but it is deepened by a sort of 
moral uneasiness which accompanies it like its echo. For 
clearly, unlimited liberty implies unlimited responsibility. If, 
for example, I go to war, I am responsible not only for my 
own killing, but for all the killing and misery that the war 
causes. If I stay home, I am responsible for all the havoc that 
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the enemy causes. If I do not send a Care package to the 
starving millions of India then it is I, and not someone else, 
who am responsible for the starving millions. Moreover, since 
we are particularly concerned with relating existentialism to 
its historical context, it is interesting to note the relevancy of 
this highly moral, if not stoic, overtone of existentialist doc- 
trine for Frenchmen, like Sartre and those of his circle, liv- 
ing in Paris during the occupation. For the occupation had 
the effect of placing an entire population in a like situation, 
of posing to every citizen the same question and the same 
alternatives: shall I seek freedom or shall I remain a slave? 
No doubt, from an existentialist viewpoint, his deliberations 
would run as follows: "If I am a slave I cannot say that it is 
the fault of the enemy. On the contrary, it was he who merely 
created the situation in which I must choose between being 
a slave and being a free man. Therefore, should I remain a 
slave, it is because I, and no one else, have chosen to be one. 
Moreover, this is a choice I have made not only for myself 
but for my compatriots as well. On the other hand, if I choose 
to be free, my only course is to resist, and in doing so I place 
myseIf in danger. I can, of course, seek to escape these alter- 
natives by masking my liberty to myself, that is, by pretend- 
ing that my enslavement is not my fault, but the fault of the 
enemy, and therefore inevitable. And yet it is my fault; other- 
wise I would have chosen to resist. The point is that in either 
case I choose freely, and my choice, whether of enslavement 
or resistance, is a responsibility that I assume." 
By the same token, a Czech or a Hungarian living under 
Communist domination who neither resists nor flees through 
tile iron curtain is as responsible for the moral and political 
crimes of Communist Russia as a member of the Comintern. 
For it is impossible to imagine a situation in which choice 
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of action is so restricted that our liberty ceases to exist. As 
paradoxical as it may sound, our liberty is inescapable. Man, 
says Sartre, is condemned to be free. And yet it is true that 
just as there were many Frenchmen in occupied France who 
chose revolt by joining the underground movement-and 
more likely than not without having entertained the slightest 
notion of liberty as Sartre describes it-so there were many 
who not only accepted enslavement but justified it. For since 
few of us have the fortitude or the temerity to go through 
life in perpetual anguish-not even, I suppose, an existentialist 
philosopher-our perpetual tendency is to mask our liberty 
to ourselves, to imagine that we do things because, in one 
way or another, we have to do them. On one level our lives 
are a series of actions, choices, projects, and on another a 
series of justScations, and we place our faith in the latter, 
although in a very deep sense, since to mask our liberty is at 
the same time to mask our responsibility, we are guilty of a 
sort of attenuated cowardice, something like the existentialist 
version of original sin. Sartre calls it "bad faith." And yet 
cowardice-or "bad faith"-is the last thing of which we 
would accuse ourselves. How is this possible? The answer 
lies in Kierkegaard's assertion that truth, when it is related 
to the human, is always paradoxical. I t  is not enough to say, 
as do traditional moral doctrines, that man is not one but two, 
for example, good and evil, flesh and spirit, and so on. It is 
truer to say that he is ambiguous: that when he is one he is 
really the other, and vice versa. But this ambiguity is moral 
only by extension. Necessarily, for the existentialist philos- 
opher, every ethical question raises a metaphysical one-or, 
better still, an ontological one. In reality it is our being itself 
which is ambiguous. 
What indeed do we mean by the word "being"? It is, I 
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suppose, as vague a term as one can imagine, and most of 
us would reply, as does the existentialist, that "being" is 
what we are. Sartre calls it the "in-itself," by which he means 
that it is our way of thinking of ourselves as though we were 
objects with fixed characteristics. From this point of view, 
"man" is an "in-itself" in the manner of a chair, a stone, a dog, 
a seashell; like each of these objects he may easily be gen- 
eralized; he may be said to have the "essence" of a man in 
the same way that we speak of the essence of a seashell, to 
which all seashells would in some way coi~espond. This was 
Plato's conception, and to a large extent it is one we all share. 
In any case, it is what we mean when we refer to our "char- 
acter" or, more generally, to "human nature." We even speak 
of certain "laws" of human nature which we must all obey 
at the risk of ceasing to be human. I once knew a man who 
was so ill-tempered that he antagonized everyone who met 
him, and when I asked him why, he looked at me as though 
my question were foolish. I imagine that his reply, if he had 
made one, would have been: "It is just the way I am" or "I 
was born that way7' or even "I take after my father." Similarly, 
many of us are inclined to excuse criminals because, as we 
say, it is their nature, they just can't help it; or else we blame 
their wickedness on their upbringing or their past environ- 
ment, which amounts to the same thing. This tendency is 
carried to absurd extremes, according to Sartre, by the psy- 
choanalysts. It is true that for Freud, as for Sartre, man is 
ambiguous, but in dividing him up, like a pie, into two un- 
equal parts, one conscious and the other unconscious, he 
committed the sophistry of explaining man as though he were 
an object while affirming that he is a subject. As a subject, 
each of us conducts himself in one way or another, as a 
criminal or a model citizen, as a good father or one who beats 
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his children, as a misanthrope or a social climber: when it 
comes to analyzing our conduct, the psychiatrist proceeds to 
delve into the past as though it were an organism, and ulti- 
mately finds the key in some dark recess of which we our- 
selves are unaware. What he finds, however, is merely an- 
other sort of justification. To the existentialist's a&~nation 
of man's total responsibility, the psychoanalyst opposes a 
doctrine of inevitable innocence, for the source of our be- 
havior is always "somewhere else," like a sort of baggage we 
can never check. And yet the duality remains. For surely we 
must never forget the pure "I" which, somehow, is carrying 
the baggage. This "I," once again, is our Iiberty. Since it is, 
as we have seen, a sort of emptiness, perhaps not unlike Pas- 
cal's abyss, it has no characteristics whatever. Sartre calls it 
the 'for-itself" as opposed to essence, the "in-itself." By this 
he means that no man can ever "be" this or that, he can only 
project to be this or that. Honest or dishonest, ill-tempered 
or charming, cowardly or brave, these are hke projects of 
what we propose to be, and being projects they are per- 
petually liable to revision. At any moment we can choose to 
be something else. Since human liberty is always intact, hu- 
man character is never a reality, but mereIy a possibility. The 
only reality is human action. The key to our behavior is not 
to be found in the past but in the future, for whatever we do, 
the character we seek to found is always in some way future 
to our project to found it. This is why Sartre says of his own 
characters that each one "after having done anything what- 
soever, can do anything whatsoever." 
Finally, if man's fundamental desire is to attain what we 
may call the certitude of being, and if his very liberty is em- 
ployed in a constant seeking of its own denial, then all our 
justifications, all our flights, all our fabrications, are them- 
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selves manifestations of that liberty. So that we are not only 
condemned to be free; at the same time we are condemned 
to deny our freedom. This is why I have hinted earlier that 
for the existentialist human existence is self-contradictory. 
For it would not be strictly true to affirm that our existence 
is our liberty, any more than one could say that it consists in 
the suppression of liberty. In reality it is both at once, like 
two mirrors whose absurd function is to reflect each other, 
and we are led to the rather dismal conclusion that, exis- 
tentially speaking, man is a failure, or, as Sartre says, "a use- 
less passion," for he is that being who affirms himself in deny- 
ing himself, whose existence is manifested in the negation of 
existence. It is true that for Hegel, too, "there is nothing in 
heaven and on earth which does not contain in itself being 
and nothingness"; but his concern, after all, was with logic, 
and this enabled him to build an extraordinary pyramid at  
whose summit, magnificently enthroned, was God. One might 
say that it was with the same sci-upulous attention to prin- 
ciple that Marconi constructed the first wireless. For the ex- 
istentialist, however-and I am obliged at this point to go 
back to Kierkegaard, for Sartre himself is mute on the sub- 
ject-no structure, no matter how complex, can reach God, 
because the space that separates us from Him is infinite. He 
can only be reached by some sort of action absolutely op- 
~ o s e d  to logic, which can best be described as a sort of leap, 
and this leap is our faith. 
Generally speaking, however, Sartre avoids the religious 
questions that existentialism raises, as manifest as they are, 
and like Heidegger insists upon the necessity for the exis- 
tentialist thinker to remain strictly in the sphere of human 
subjectivity. This has led Sartre's critics to object that existen- 
tialism is a solipsism, to which Sartre himself replies that it is 
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really a humanism, whereupon his critics retort that if it is 
a humanism it is a singularly pessimistic one, For one thing, 
he has not tried to s t  man into a larger scheme of things; he 
has not, like Nietzsche and Bergson, assured us that he is 
going on to a bigger and better future. Perhaps he would 
subscribe to Baudelaire's famous remark that "the world is 
coming to an end-the only reason for it to continue is that it 
exists." Certainly few thinkers with existentialist leanings 
would agree that the world is a better place today because 
we have frozen foods and television, and that it will be a 
better place tomol~ow because television will be in color and 
three dimensions. Nor, I think, would they condemn it be- 
cause our wars are getting bigger and better and because 
divorces and alcoholism are on the upswing. To do this re- 
quires an objective view of history, a view which many his- 
torians have claimed to enjoy, on the assumption that it is 
possible for an individual to disengage himself from history 
in order to judge it. But we have already seen that a major 
theme of existentialism is that we are engaged, totally and 
inevitably: in other words, that our Liberty is manifested here 
and now and nowhere else and a t  no other time. The lesson 
of existentialism-one that may be applied equally to oc- 
cupied France and to postwar America-is that the question 
of the superiority of one age over another is beside the point; 
that there is only one crisis, and it is the one in which we are 
involved and which we must assume and for which we must 
provide the solution. I t  is like no other crisis because it is our 
crisis. The wars of Korea and Indo-China, the menace of 
Communism, the hydrogen bomb, the rising cost of living: 
these are somehow bound up with our existence as intimately 
as the clothes we wear, the houses we live in, the members 
of our family, and even when we are least aware of them 
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they hover about the edges of our situations like a mist, dis- 
tant and yet somehow imminent; and in this sense it is true 
to say that every man is '%haunted" by his historical obliga- 
tions as by a ghost. Existentialism is a humanism and, indeed, 
an optimistic one, when it declares that man is the fabricator 
of his own destiny and that he is free to make of it what he 
will. I t  takes on a distinctly less optimistic cast when it 
affirms that his freedom is not relative but absolute, that man 
must fashion his own time out of nothing, that his true his- 
tory is not in his past but in his future, and that not statesmen 
or generals or leaders of industly but each living human being 
is profoundIy and inescapably accountable for the way of the 
world. 
I t  seems, however, that we are drifting away from the 
existentialist's primary assertion that man is a "useless pas- 
sion" and saying something that is exactly the opposite. For 
if man not only chooses himself but chooses the world as 
well, then there is nothing in the world that does not in some 
way derive its significance from human liberty; our moral 
sense itself may be said to spring from human Iibei-ty and its 
inevitable concomitant, human responsibility. The truth is 
that we have never wandered veiy far from the circle of con- 
tradictions to which existentialist reflection is committed, if 
indeed we have left it at all. Sartre's humanism finds its nat- 
ural limits in human absurdity. On the one hand man is in 
the universe Like a stranger at a ball to which he has not been 
invited. In all that vast formalism-that cosmic ritual-we call 
the universe, only man is unpredictable because only man is 
free, and his liberty has all the impertinence of an informal- 
ity, a breach of etiquette. And yet his liberty moves about in 
that universe like a lord in its own domain, in a perpetua1 
project of creation and destruction. 
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To this enigma there is, properly speaking, no solution. If 
there were, it would not be a solution at all, but merely an- 
other way of posing the enigma. There are no answers to the 
questions that human existence raises except other questions. 
This is why the existentialist philosopher, if there is such a 
thing as an existentialist philosopher, is given to a form of 
dialectic which reminds one of a mouse racing along the in- 
side of a wheel. At every moment he is forced to refute what 
he affirms and affirm what he refutes, to define one horn of 
the human dilemma and simultaneously-if that is possible- 
confess that its existence is absolutely contradicted by the 
other, Basically, as an attempt to give a positive significance 
to sheer nothingness and to build upon it a system of human 
values-one that Heidegger, for example, has made in a bril- 
liant and subtle essay, What is Metaphysics?-existentialism 
is a scandal in the face of logic for, as St. Thomas has said, 
'Zverything which comes from nothing tends of itself toward 
nothing." The truth is that the existentialists, being com- 
mitted to paradox, are themselves paradoxical. Their method 
consists in a rigorous refutation of philosophical method, and 
yet they insist on making the refutation philosopl~ically. This 
is why their accomplishment in this realm, it seems to me, 
amounts largely to what the newspapers call, in another con- 
nection, "a palace revolution." Actually, by shifting the center 
of gravity of philosophical investigation from questions about 
ourselves to questions about our questions, they have moved 
out of the realm of philosophy altogether, into the realm of 
action. And yet their very endeavor to achieve what amounts 
after all to a kind of "relativism" of the absolute, an uneasy 
pact between subjectivity and circumstance, or more broadly, 
between idealism and materialism, is exceedingly dangerous 
when, as recently in Sartre's case, it is projected on the politi- 
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cal level, for then ambiguity becomes equivocation, if not 
pure and simple charlatanism; and it is small wonder that 
Sartre himself has been attacked in France with equal feroc- 
ity by those at the Center and those at the Left, and that he 
has alternately attacked and flirted with both opponents. For 
surely not the smallest of the inconsistencies to which the 
student of existentialist doctrine is exposed is the belief that 
one can "be" an existentialist in the same way, for example, 
as one can be a vegetarian, a Rosicrucian, or a Democrat. One 
can, perhaps, live "existentially," that is to say, lucidly, freely, 
and courageously, but because existentialism itself is situated 
at some indefinable point between philosophy and life, its 
position is no position at all. Nietzsche used to say that the 
charm of a theory is that it can be refuted. The bewildering 
thing about existentialism is that to the objection, "But my 
dear fellow, what you ase saying is completely absurd," its 
apologists reply: "Precisely. Now we are beginning to under- 
stand each other." 
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